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7Preface
The conference “COFOLA = Conference for Young Lawyers” is annually 
organized by the Masaryk University, Faculty of  Law from 2007. The main 
aim of  this conference is to give floor to the doctoral students and young 
scientists at their early stage of  career and enable them to present the results 
of  their scientific activities.
Since 2013 COFOLA has been enriched by a special part called “COFOLA 
INTERNATIONAL”. COFOLA INTERNATIONAL focuses primarily 
on issues of  international law and the regulation of  cross-border relations 
and is also oriented to doctoral students and young scientists from foreign 
countries. COFOLA INTERNATIONAL contributes to the development 
of  international cooperation between students and young scientists from 
different countries. It constitutes the platform for academic discussion and 
develops scientific and presentation skills of  young scientists. Such a plat-
form for scientific debate beyond the boundaries of  one country contrib-
utes to the global view on the law, which is so important in current days.
COFOLA INTERNATIONAL 2019 focused on the Private Enforcement 
of  Antitrust Law and Unfair Competition with Cross-border Element. Same 
as in previous years the participants from several countries had very lively 
discussions and covered various current and interesting topics. The confer-
ence proceedings unfortunately contain only a limited number of  papers. 
There were more applications to the conference and more oral presenta-
tions. Only the following papers have been submitted in written form and 
have been recommended by reviewers for publication.
Klára Drličková 
(scientific and organizational guarantor of  COFOLA INTERNATIONAL)
COFOLA INTERNATIONAL 2019 - Conference Proceedings
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Constitutional Questions about the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Action...: 
The Rule of Binding Effect of National 
Competition Authorities’ Decisions
Enrico Verdolini
Department of Law, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Abstract
The Directive 2014/104/EU fixes specific rules about the relation-
ship between antitrust public enforcement and antitrust private enforce-
ment. More specifically, Article 9(1) of  the Directive states that National 
Competition Authorities’ decisions has got binding effects in civil litiga-
tion before a judge of  the same Member State. Article 9(1) raises differ-
ent doubts about its consistency with the principles of  separation of  con-
stitutional powers and fair trial, affirmed by the ECHR, the EU Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights and the Member States’ Constitutions. There could 
be different possible solutions. Which is the judge’s role in the context 
of  antitrust private enforcement?
Keywords
Antitrust Private Enforcement; Binding Effect of  National Competition 
Authorities’ Decisions; Right of  Defence; Separation of  Powers.
1 Introduction: Two Constitutional Questions about 
the Article 9(1) of the Directive 2014/104/EU
The Directive 2014/104/EU establishes important rules about the coor-
dination between the two pillars of  European antitrust enforcement: 
COFOLA INTERNATIONAL 2019 - Conference Proceedings
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the aim is to ensure the effective application of  the Articles 101 and 102 
of  the TFEU.1
The Directive 2014/104/EU fixes the legal value of  final decisions 
of  National Competition Authorities, in the context of  the antitrust private 
enforcement, distinguishing between two hypothetical situations.
First of  all, Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU states that any 
national civil court must recognize a binding effect to the definitive decision 
of  the same Member State’s National Competition Authority.
Article 9(1) is valid for National Competition Authorities’ final decisions: 
these decisions cannot be appealed before a judge, because the relative term 
to claim is expired or the administrative act was confirmed by judge’s ruling.
Article 9(2) adds then another rule to its abovementioned first part: any 
decision adopted from Member States’ National Competition Authorities 
have got a legal value of  prima facie evidence before a different Member 
State’s national civil court: it means that these decisions have no binding 
effect. Through the Directive 2014/104/EU, they gain, however, a remark-
able role of  evidence in the context of  civil judge’s evaluation.
Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU, in particular, raises two differ-
ent constitutional questions. The first question refers to the principle of  fair 
1 The network composed of  Member States’ Competition Authorities and the European 
Commission is responsible for antitrust public enforcement: the most important aim 
of  the first pillar is to ensure markets’ equilibrium, sanctioning certain category of  under-
takings’ behaviours, like abuses of  dominant position and agreements that are restric-
tive of  competition. It means that the European Competition Network pursues the goal 
of  public interest’s realization. In this general context, Member States’ civil judges can take 
a complementary role in the application of  European antitrust law. The task of  the second 
pillar, the antitrust private enforcement, is satisfying private interests damaged by anticom-
petitive conducts: antitrust rules can be invoked by private citizens or undertakings before 
the civil judge, in order to obtain a serious restoration. It is possible to affirm that these two 
pillars, the first one consisting in the activity of  the European Competition Network, the 
second one based on the functions of  Member States’ civil judges, can pursue the scope 
to realize optimal enforcement of  European antitrust law, working in a complementary way.
WHISH, Richard and David BAILEY. Competition Law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018, pp. 306–324; DANIELE, Luigi. Law of  the Common Market. 
Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 2016, pp. 313–317; FATTORI, Pietro and Mario TODINO. 
Competition Law in Italy. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010, pp. 481–523; DUNNE, Niham. The 
Role of  Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law, University of  Cambridge Faculty 
of  Law Research Paper, 2014, Vol. XVI, No. 36, pp. 143–187; WILS, Wouter P. Private 
Enforcement of  EU Antitrust Law and its Relationship with Public Enforcement: Past, Present and 
Future, World Competition. 2017, Vol. XL, No. 1, pp. 3–45.
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trial and the concept of  equality of  arms between the disputing parties: can 
the binding effect of  the decision limit the counterpart’s right of  defence? 
This is an important issue that involves, most of  all, the exercise of  a funda-
mental right of  the citizen.
The second question refers to the problem of  the consistency 
of  the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU with the principle 
of  independence of  the judiciary: can the judge be subjected to the binding 
decision of  a National Competition Authority? This issue involves the idea 
of  separation of  public powers. In general terms, can the judiciary branch 
of  the State be subjected to the administrative branch?
The method of  the present research is to analyse both the constitutional questions 
raised by the transposition of  the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU. 
The study will concern, first of  all, the nature of  the constitutional principles 
that are involved. In a second moment, the analysis will focus on the problems 
of  the consistency of  the Article 9(1) with these constitutional values from 
a European perspective. It will be important, most of  all, to determine the 
extension of  the limitations of  these constitutional principles by the transpo-
sition of  the Article 9(1): the study will try to assess these questions through 
the standard methodology of  proportionality test.
The research will use as references the core principles established in the 
UDHR, the ECHR as amended by the Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 supple-
mented by the Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, the CFREU and 
of  the constitutions2 of  the EU Member States (the analysis will focus on the 
main models of  constitution). The research will also refer to the relevant 
case law of  the European Court of  Human Rights, of  the Court of  Justice 
and of  the national constitutional courts (in particular, two relevant cases 
from the Republic of  Italy and the Republic of  Bulgaria).
The aim of  the present study is to propose a possible solution to the constitutional 
questions that are connected to the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU, 
coherently with the sources adopted as references. The final scope is to solve 
the critical issues and to facilitate the application of  antitrust law.
2 MORRONE, Andrea. Constitutions and European Law. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 
2014; PALICI DI SUNI PRAT, Elisabetta, Fabrizio CASSELLA and Mario COMBA. 
European Member States‘ Constitutions. Padova: Cedam, 2001.
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2 Article 9 of the Directive 2014/104/EU and the 
Debate about the First Proposal of the White Paper
The White Paper on Damages Action for Breach of  the EU Antitrust Rules3 
(“White Paper”) was published by European Commission on 2 April 2008.4 
It paved the way to the Directive 2014/104/EU.
The White Paper contained the following draft of  the relevant rule: “National 
courts that have to rule in actions for damages on practices under Article 81 or 82 
on which an N.C.A. in the E.C.N. has already given a final decision finding an infringe-
ment of  those articles, or on which a review court has given a final judgment upholding the 
N.C.A decision or itself  finding an infringement, cannot take decisions running counter 
to any such decision or ruling.”
The text of  the White Paper recognized a binding effect to the decisions 
of  any Antitrust Authority of  the European Competition Network in the 
context of  civil litigation. It did not make a distinction between two differ-
ent hypothetical situations. The rationale of  White Paper’s original formula-
tion is different from the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU.
The White Paper text was based on a specific model, namely the Article 16(1) 
of  the Regulation 1/2003.5 The said provision states: “When national courts 
rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of  the Treaty 
which are already the subject of  a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions run-
ning counter to the decision adopted by the Commission.”
The first proposals of  the Article 9 of  the Directive 2014/104/EU’s draft 
followed the same perspective of  the White Paper and of  the Article 16(1) 
of  the Regulation 1/2003:6 the original intention was to adopt a directive that 
could recognize the same binding effect before civil courts to the decisions 
3 White Paper on Damages Action for Breach of  the EC Antitrust Rules [online]. European 
Commission – Competition [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
4 WILS, Wouter P. Private Enforcement of  EU Antitrust Law and its Relationship with 
Public Enforcement: Past, Present and Future. World Competition, 2017, Vol. XL, No. 1, p. 
22.
5 NAZZINI, Renato. The Effect of  Decision by Competition Authorities in the European 
Union. Italian Antitrust Review, 2015, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 68.
6 MEROLA, Massimo and Leonardo ARMATI. The Binding Effect of  NCA Decisions 
under the Damages Directive: Rationale and Practical Implications. Italian Antitrust 
Review, 2016, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 95-97.
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rendered by any European Network’s National Competition Authority. This 
proposal was criticized by some Member States and, most of  all, from the 
Independent Authorities of  Italy and France.
From Italian Authorities’7 perspective, as pointed out in the docu-
ment with the title Italian Authorities’ Observations about the European 
Commission’s White Paper in Matter of  Actions for Damages for 
Infringement of  the European Antitrust Rules (“Italian Authorities’ 
Document”), the White Paper proposed rules that could reduce the exten-
sion of  the right of  defence in the context of  civil litigations.
According to the Italian Authorities’ Document, first of  all there was 
a problem about the application of  the rule of  binding effect to the Italian 
Competition Authority’s decisions before the Italian civil court. Moreover, 
the same question was present in the case of  the application of  the rule 
to other Member States’ Competition Authorities decisions.8 These issues 
involved the consistency of  the proposals of  the White Paper with a right, 
the right of  defence, characterized by a strong protection accorded by the 
Article 24 and Article 111 of  the Constitution of  the Italian Republic9 
(“Italian Constitution”).
French Authorities, in their document The White Paper about Actions for 
Damages and Interests for Infringements of  the European Laws about 
Agreements and Abuses of  Dominant Position – French Authorities’ 
Observations10 (“French Authorities’ Document”), emphasized that rules 
contained in the White Paper could have a further effect in the context 
of  legal order: “A similar measure could modify in a deep way the inner legal order 
7 Italian Authorities’ Observations about the European Commission’s White Paper in Matter 
of  Actions for Damages for Infringement of  the European Antitrust Rules [online]. European 
Commission – Competition [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
8 Italian Authorities’ document about White Paper affirmed: “The White Paper would like 
to rule the binding nature of  the decisions of  the National Competition Authorities in civil proceedings 
for damages, not only within the Member State where the decisions are issued, but also in respect of  all 
the other Member States. In this regard, the Italian Authorities are strongly against both of  these exten-
sions (…).”
9 REPUBLIC OF ITALY. Constitution of  the Italian Republic. Senato della Repubblica 
Italiana [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
10 The White Paper about Actions for Damages and Interests for Infringements of  the European Laws 
about Agreements and Abuses of  Dominant Position – French Authorities’ Observations [online]. 
European Commission – Competition [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
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of  the Member States, as France, in which the value of  ruling is not accorded to an act 
issued from an administrative instance, as National Competition Authority (…).” 11 So, 
French Authorities underlined, in particular, the consequences of  the intro-
duction of  White Paper’s draft, containing rules dealing with the equilib-
rium of  powers: French Authorities’ Document referred without distinction 
to the two cases of  application of  the rule of  binding effects, as in the case 
of  Italian Authorities’ document.
It is important to consider that the original formulation of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU was not adopted in the final text. Following to the criticisms 
raised up by Italian and French Authorities12, the Council changed partially 
the text of  the Article 9, in particular Article 9(2).
After the modification, the constitutional questions raised by the first 
version of  the Article 9 were partially solved and, most of  all, confined 
to the Article 9(1). However, the analysis will focus only on the actual ver-
sion of  the Article 9(1) that regards the relationship between the civil judge 
and the National Competition Authority of  the same Member State: the 
constitutional questions now involve only institutions belonging to the same 
national legal order.
3 The First Constitutional Question about the 
Transposition of the Directive 2014/104/EU: 
The Alleged Violation of the Right of Defence
The first constitutional question raised on the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU refers to the consistency of  the same Directive with counter-
parts’ right of  defence in the context of  civil litigation.
The principle of  fair trial is stated by different international sources, 
first of  all Article 8 and Article 10 of  the UDHR, Article 5 and Article 6 
11 A document with a similar perspective was issued by Portuguese Competition Authority. 
See Comment of  the Portuguese Competition Authority on the White Paper about Actions for 
Damages for Infringements of  the European Antitrust Laws [online]. European Commission – 
Competition [cit. 3. 9. 2019]. The Portuguese Competition Authority affirmed that: “The 
rule proposed by the Commission can be considered in contrast with the principles of  separation of  pow-
ers and independence of  judges.”
12 SQUILLANTE, Francesco. A Brief  Overview of  the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions. Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 161.
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of  the ECHR and Article 47 of  the CFREU; it is affirmed also by the con-
stitutions of  the EU Member States.13
The principle of  fair trial implies the concept of  equality of  arms. The 
respect of  these principles is important not only in the context of  criminal 
cases, but also in the context of  civil cases.
The jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human Rights evidenced 
as equality of  arms implies that “each party must be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him 
at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”. However, a fair trial should 
be characterized by a fair balance between the parties.14
Initially, the Court of  Justice transposed in its jurisprudence this interpre-
tation of  the Article 6 of  the ECHR.15 In a second moment, the Court 
of  Justice started to apply in its decisions Article 47 of  the CFREU that 
is similar to the Article 6 of  the ECHR.16
The first constitutional question that this study analyses is if  the Article 9(1) 
of  the Directive 2014/104/EU, that grants binding effect for National 
Competition Authorities’ decisions, can undermine the counterpart’s right 
of  defence, causing a violation of  the principle of  equality of  arms.
Before the Directive 2014/104/EU, the subject (a private consumer 
or an undertaking17) that was harmed by an antitrust law infringement, 
13 MORRONE, Andrea. Constitutions and European Law. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 
2014, pp. 286–287 (Article 111 of  the Constitution of  the Italian Republic), pp. 499–500 
(Article 103 of  the Fundamental Law of  the German Federal Republic), p. 581 (Article 24 
of  the Constitution of  the Kingdom of  Spain); PALICI DI SUNI PRAT, Elisabetta, Fabrizio 
CASSELLA and Mario COMBA. European Member States‘ Constitutions. Padova: Cedam, 2001.
14 See e.g. judgment of  European Court of  Human Rights of  27 October 1993, Dombo Beheer 
b.v. v. the Netherlands, Application No. 14448/88. In: HUDOC [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
15 See judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  2 December 2009, European Commission v. Ireland 
and others, case C-89/08. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019]; judgment of  the Court 
of  Justice of  26 June 2007, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and others v. 
Conseil des Ministres, case C-305/05. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
16 See e.g. judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  6 November 2012, European Commission v. Otis 
and others, case C-199/11. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019]; judgment of  the Court 
of  Justice of  16 May 2017, Berlioz Investment Fund SA v. Directeur de l’administration des 
contributions directes, case C-682/15. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
17 SCUFFI, Massimo. Antitrust Damages Actions: The New Framework of  the Legislative 
Decree 3 of  2017 that Transposed the Directive 2014/104/EU and Further European 
Perspectives. In: BENACCHIO, Gian Antonio and Michele CARPAGNANO. 
Institutional Assets and Perspectives of  Application of  the Private Antitrust Enforcement in the 
European Union. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, p. 84.
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as for example abuse of  dominant position or cartels, started the civil litiga-
tion from a weak position. The injured party needed information that were 
not easy to collect. It was necessary a complex investigation,18 through tech-
nical instruments, in order to acquire all the economic data and the factual 
evidence of  the case, presenting the necessary framework of  proof.
First of  all, this investigation had to be carried out by an expert or a profes-
sional: specific skills and knowledge were required to conduct the inves-
tigation.19 Secondly, the investigation could interest a relevant market 
of  remarkable dimensions, in which multiple undertakings may take part 
into, in a complex competitive framework. For these reasons, said inves-
tigation could be actually difficult for a private consumer to be run, from 
a practical point of  view.
Most of  all, the information that the claimant needed could be held by the 
author of  the anticompetitive conduct or by a third party. There could 
be a situation of  asymmetric information, in which the consumer could 
have assumed a disadvantaged position.
The private consumer had to fix the quantum of  the harm suffered, through 
a determination of  the damnum emergens (the concrete loss for the anticom-
petitive behaviour) and lucrum cessans (the potential profit that was lost): 
it was difficult to determine the exact amount of  damages, considering that 
it was hard for the claimant to obtain all the necessary information and ele-
ments of  proof.20
For these reasons, the Directive 2014/104/EU introduces new rules 
about antitrust private enforcement, in order to reinforce the position 
18 RORDORF, Renato. The Role of  the Judge and the Role of  the Italian Market and 
Competition Authority in the Context of  Antitrust Damages Action. Società, 2014, 
Vol. XXVIII, No. 7, p. 784; SQUILLANTE, Francesco. A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
of  the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, Vol. II, 
No. 1, pp. 159–164.
19 PARDOLESI, Roberto. Antitrust Private Enforcement: A Fantastic Animal, and Where 
to Find It. In: BENACCHIO, Gian Antonio and Michele CARPAGNANO. Institutional 
Assets and Perspectives of  Application of  the Private Antitrust Enforcement in the European Union. 
Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, p. 52.
20 WHISH, Richard and David BAILEY. Competition Law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018, p. 312.
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of  the private consumer, to make easier gathering information and to enable 
his action before the civil judge.21
It is possible to quote different Articles of  the Directive 2014/104/EU, like 
Article 5 and others, about the disclosure of  relevant evidence, that empower 
the national courts to order the defendant or a third party (including public 
Authorities) to produce documents that are necessary to the claimant’s argu-
mentation; Article 9 and others, that fixes the legal value of  the decision 
of  National Competition Authorities in the context of  the civil litigation, 
making easier the assessment of  the behaviour; Article 17(1), that author-
izes the quantification of  damages by the national court, avoiding a situation 
in which “it is practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the harm 
suffered on the basis of  the evidence available”; Article 17(2) that establishes the pre-
sumption that cartels are anticompetitive conduct causing damages, because 
the losses due to cartels are difficult to demonstrate for the consumers.
In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the Directive 2014/104/EU tries 
to remove the obstacles that prevent the consumer from obtaining a full res-
toration of  the antitrust damages he suffered. In several cases, these obsta-
cles consist of  difficulties in accessing information.
The Directive 2014/104/EU pursues the goal to solve the asymmetry 
of  information between the parties of  the civil litigation through different 
instruments. Article 9(1) is one of  these instruments.
Article 9(1) determines different consequences in the context of  the civil 
court: first of  all, it is possible to think about a hypothesis of  limitation 
of  counterpart’s right of  defence.
21 SQUILLANTE, Francesco. A Brief  Overview of  the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions. Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 159–164; DE SANTIS, Angelo 
Danilo. The Directive 2014/104/EU and Its Consequences in the Context of  Civil 
Litigation. In: GIUSTOLISI, Claudia. The Directive Consumer Rights. Roma: Roma Tre 
Press, 2017, pp. 145–159; PARDOLESI, Roberto. Antitrust Private Enforcement: 
A Fantastic Animal, and Where to Find It. In: BENACCHIO, Gian Antonio and 
Michele CARPAGNANO. Institutional Assets and Perspectives of  Application of  the Private 
Antitrust Enforcement in the European Union. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, p. 59–61; 
MUSCOLO, Gabriella. The New Institutional Asset of  Antitrust Private Enforcement 
in Italy and in the European Union: The Cooperation Between Public and Private 
Enforcement. In: BENACCHIO, Gian Antonio and Michele CARPAGNANO. 
Institutional Assets and Perspectives of  Application of  the Private Antitrust Enforcement in the 
European Union. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, pp. 15–25.
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The civil proceeding represents the first institutional space in which there 
is a confrontation of  the damaged party with the undertaking22 that altered 
the market’s equilibrium (through its anticompetitive agreement, its prac-
tice or its abuse of  dominant position): it is not possible to run this kind 
of  confrontation in the context of  the administrative proceeding before the 
National Competition Authority. In fact, in the administrative procedure, 
the case law is about the comparison between the undertaking and the pub-
lic interest held by the same institution.
Despite that civil litigation is the first space of  debate between the par-
ties, the author of  the anticompetitive conduct cannot oppose any objection 
to the National Competition Authority’s binding decision. The defendant 
cannot criticize the reconstruction of  the conduct contained in the deci-
sion, suggesting a different author, a divergent description of  the factual 
evidence or a new framework of  evidence; he cannot present an alternative 
economic analysis about the infringement, its relevant market and its dura-
tion; he cannot propose another legal qualification of  the behaviour, using 
the categories of  antitrust law. In conclusion, the defendant cannot submit 
to the judge any reconstruction or legal interpretation not consistent with 
the content of  the National Competition Authority’s decision.
The rule of  binding effect contained in the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU does not allow a debate between the parties about the most 
important elements of  the factual case in the context of  the civil litigation; 
this lack of  discussion, most of  all, could limit counterpart’s right of  defence.
During the civil proceeding, there is the possibility of  a limitation of  the right 
of  defence by the application of  the Article 9(1). In order to evaluate this 
criticism, before drawing conclusions, it’s necessary to consider also another 
element in the general context.
22 PORENA, Daniela. Remarks and Observations, with a Constitutional Perspective, 
about Legislative Decree 3 of  2017 (Transposition of  the Directive 2014/104/EU about 
Antitrust Private Enforcement). National Judge’s Role: From Subjection of  Judiciary 
to the Law to Subjection of  Judiciary to the Law And… National Competition 
Authority? Federalismi, 2018, Vol. XVI, No. 7, pp. 22–29.
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In the case European Commission v. Otis and others23 the Court of  Justice 
affirmed the importance of  the antitrust damages action: “Any person can 
claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that 
harm and an agreement or practice prohibited.” This right of  action must be exer-
cised observing the principle of  fair trial and equality of  arms provided 
by the Article 47 of  the CFREU.
The Court of  Justice also clarified that the Article 16(1) of  the Regulation 
1/2003 fixed the rule of  binding effect for the European Commission’s deci-
sion before the civil tribunal. Any national civil judge, in the context of  civil 
litigation about antitrust damages action, could not run against the European 
Commission’s decision on the same actual case.
The Court of  Justice evidenced that the Article 16(1) did not breach the principle 
of  fair trial and that the European legal system ensured the fundamental rights 
of  the defendant: the decision of  the European Commission could be appealed 
before the same Court of  Justice. So, the Court of  Justice could review the 
content of  the Commission’s decision: the counterpart’s right of  defence was 
guaranteed by the possibility of  deep scrutiny of  the Commission’s decision 
by the European judge. Moreover, the Court of  Justice could discuss the analy-
sis of  the economic elements and the interpretation of  the European antitrust 
law conducted by the European Commission.
In the context of  each national legal system, the evaluation about the exten-
sion of  an alleged violation of  the counterpart’s right of  defence is linked 
to the clarification of  an element: it is the possibility of  a direct judiciary 
review of  the National Competition Authority’s decision. If  there is the 
chance to appeal the decision of  the Authority before a court, the situa-
tion can be different. It is important to consider if  the national tribunal 
can review the decision, starting from the point of  view of  the author 
of  the anticompetitive behaviour. It is also important to consider what are 
the powers of  the judge in the context of  the judiciary review. Therefore, 
in order to evaluate the consistency of  the Article 9(1) with the princi-
ple of  right of  defence, the interpretation must consider also the context 
of  the judicial system of  each Member State.
23 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  6 November 2012, European Commission v. Otis and 
others, case C-199/11. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
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4 The Second Constitutional Question 
about the Transposition of the Directive 
2014/104/EU: The Alleged Violation 
of the Principles of the Independence 
of the Judiciary and Separation of Powers
The second constitutional question about the transposition of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU regards the alleged violation of  the principle of  independ-
ence of  the judiciary, a principle that characterizes the constitutional legal 
order of  all the European democracies,24 as part of  the concept of  separa-
tion of  powers; this principle is stated also by the Article 47 of  CFREU 
and by the Article 6 of  the ECHR, affirming the need of  “an independent and 
impartial tribunal”.
The final decision of  the National Competition Authority, having binding 
effect pursuant to the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU, can limit 
the judge’s power to examine each actual behaviour: after the Authority act, 
that has concluding the proceeding of  the antitrust public enforcement, the 
civil court cannot examine important factual elements of  the infringement 
(the author of  the infringement, the relevant market, the temporal dura-
tion of  the behaviour, its material features…); most of  all, the judge cannot 
ascertain the legal qualification of  the infringement, because this evaluation 
has already been fulfilled by the binding decision of  the Authority.25
Furthermore, in the case of  the Italian legal order, the civil court cannot exer-
cise the power of  disusing the administrative act, established by the Article 5 
of  Law 2249/1865 containing Rules on Administrative Dispute, a power 
that characterizes in particular the Italian civil judge: in the Italian legal 
24 MORRONE, Andrea. Constitutions and European Law. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2014, 
pp. 284–285 (Article 101 and Article 104 of  the Constitution of  the Italian Republic), p. 365 
(Article 64 of  the Constitution of  the French Republic), p. 497 (Article 97 of  the Fundamental 
Law of  the German Federal Republic), p. 633 (Article 117 of  the Constitution of  the Kingdom 
of  Spain); PALICI DI SUNI PRAT, Elisabetta, Fabrizio CASSELLA and Mario COMBA. 
European Member States‘ Constitutions. Padova: Cedam, 2001.
25 BARIATTI, Stefania and Luca PERFETTI. First Observation about the Provision 
of  “White Paper For Damages Actions in Antitrust Law Infringements” 
of  the Commission and of  the Consumer Code in Matter of  Relationship Between 
Antitrust Proceedings and Jurisdiction. Italian Review of  European Public Law, 2008, Vol. 
XVIII, No. 5, pp. 1173–1176.
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system, in one specific case, if  an administrative act is found to be against 
a law, the judge can decide to ignore the act in his general evaluation during 
the civil litigation.
In the context of  actions for antitrust damages, this particular power 
is limited26 by the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU and by the 
Article 7 of  the Legislative decree 3/201727 that transposes the Directive 
2014/104/EU in the Italian legal order.28
The constitutional question, in general, is if  an administrative institution, 
like a National Competition Authority, with its own binding effect decisions, 
can limit the role and the powers of  the judge in civil litigation, contribut-
ing to determine the content of  the sentence. It is difficult to answer this 
question in a positive way: can a decision of  the administrative body prevail 
over the pronouncement of  the judiciary power, influencing its decision 
making-process?
In the present study, it is necessary to consider the jurisprudence of  the Court 
of  Justice about the legal nature of  National Competition Authorities. Most 
of  all, it is important to evidence Syfait case. 29
26 PORENA, Daniela. Remarks and Observations, with a Constitutional Perspective, 
about Legislative Decree 3 of  2017 (Transposition of  the Directive 2014/104/EU about 
Antitrust Private Enforcement). National Judge’s Role: From Subjection of  Judiciary 
to the Law to Subjection of  Judiciary to the Law And… National Competition 
Authority? Federalismi, 2018, Vol. XVI, No. 7, pp. 19–21.
27 REPUBLIC OF ITALY. Legislative decree 3/2017 containing implementation of  Directive 
2014/104/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 November 2014 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union 
Text. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
28 The Legislative decree 3/2017 affirms in Article 7(1) that “for the purposes of  the action for 
compensation for damages, it is considered definitively ascertained, in relation to the author, the infringement 
of  the competition law established by a decision of  the Italian Competition Authority, referred to art. 10 
of  the law 287/1990, no longer subject to appeal before the Court of  Appeal, or by a judgment of  the Court 
of  Appeal which has become res judicata” (the law 287/1990 is official known in the Italian legal 
order as law 287/1990 containing Rules on Protection of  Competition and Market).
29 Judgement of  the Court of  Justice of  31 May 2005, Syfait and others v. GlaxoSmithKline, 
case C-53/03. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019]; BARENTS, Renè. Directory 
of  EU Case Law on the Preliminary Ruling Procedure. Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 
2009, p. 67; EZRACHI, Ariel. EU Competition Law. An Analytical Guide to the Leading 
Cases. 5th ed. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 617; BROBERG, Morten 
and Niels FENGER. Preliminary References to the European Court of  Justice. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 90; MENTO, Sandro. Case Comment. Administrative 
Law Journal, 2005, No. 12, pp. 1279–1284.
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In Syfait case, the Court of  Justice found that the Greek Competition 
Commission cannot be qualified as a court or tribunal; therefore, the Greek 
Competition Commission could not apply to the Court of  Justice for a pre-
liminary ruling.
There are different reasons that explain said decision. First of  all, the Greek 
Competition Commission is subjected to the supervision of  the Minister 
for Development: it implies that the Minister is empowered to review the 
lawfulness of  its decisions. In addition, the Greek Government can influ-
ence the decision making-process of  the Commission: in fact, no particular 
guarantees of  the independence of  the members of  the Commission are 
granted by Greek law, especially with reference to their dismissal or to their 
office’s term.
The Court of  Justice pointed out that the relationship between the 
Government and the Greek Competition Commission allows to qualify 
the body as dependent from the executive. It is possible therefore to affirm 
that there is, at least, a National Competition Authority of  the European 
Competition Network that is not completely independent from the State 
executive power: this means that the content of  Greek Competition 
Commission’s decisions can be determined also by a political institu-
tion. However, the argumentation of  the Court of  Justice in the Syfait case 
makes more difficult the application of  the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU in the context of  civil litigation.
Another important jurisprudence about the role and the nature of  National 
Competition Authorities in the context of  the constitutional system 
of  check and balances is the jurisprudence of  the Italian Constitutional 
Court. Most of  all it shall be analysed one of  its recent cases: the decision 
of  the Constitutional Court of  Italy of  5 December 201830 firmly excludes 
that nature and the functions of  the Italian Antitrust Authority may be con-
sidered as judiciary ones. The Constitutional Court’s decision ascertains their 
pure administrative substance, using the traditional concept of  public admin-
istration and public interest. So, the decision classifies the Italian Competition 
30 Decision of  the Constitutional Court, Italy of  5 December 2018, No. 13/2019. In: Corte 
Costituzionale – Ricerca delle pronounce dal 1956 ad oggi [online]. The Italian Constitutional 
Court [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
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Authority as a part of  the administrative branch, referring to the standard 
model of  public administration contained in administrative law. The deci-
sion raises different problems in the context of  this study: the common 
idea of  public administration is the idea of  an organization that is subjected 
to the political address of  the executive power. Can the decision undermine 
the concept of  independence of  the Italian Competition Authority?
Finally, there is also another case that involved another Member State, namely 
the decision of  the Constitutional Court of  Bulgaria of  24 September 1998, 
No. 22/199831 that can be relevant in the context of  the present research.
While Article 8 of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  Bulgaria32 enshrines 
the traditional principle of  separation of  powers,33 Article 117(2) of  the same 
Constitution specifies the principle of  independence of  the judiciary.34
In 1998 the Constitutional Court of  Bulgaria ruled about the Article 36 
of  the Protection of  Competition Act35 that established that National 
Competition Authority’s decisions had a binding effect in the context 
of  civil proceedings; this rule was similar to the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU.
The decision of  the Constitutional Court of  Bulgaria pointed out that the 
Article 36 conflicted with the principles of  independence of  the judiciary: 
the binding effect of  decisions could be recognized only to the acts that 
were confirmed by a judicial review of  the Supreme Administrative Court.
This case is an important precedent to be considered in the general con-
text of  the present analysis: the Constitutional Court of  Bulgaria affirmed 
that there was a violation of  the principle of  separation of  power due 
to the binding effects connected with the decision.
31 PÄRN-LEE, Evelin. Effect of  National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages 
in the CEE Countries. Yearbook of  Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2017, Vol X, No. 15, 
pp. 186–187.
32 REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA. Constitution of  the Republic of  Bulgaria. National 
Assembly of  the Republic of  Bulgaria [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
33 “The power of  the State shall be divided between legislative, executive and judicial branches.”
34 “The judiciary shall be independent. In the performance of  their functions, all judges, court assessors, 
prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be subservient only to the law.”
35 REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA. Protection of  Competition Act promulgated in State 
Gazette 102/2008. United Nations Conference on Trade and Government [online]. [cit. 
3. 9. 2019].
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5 A Different Solution to Promote 
Antitrust Damages Actions
Through the model of  proportionality test it is possible to assess the con-
stitutional questions raised by the rule of  binding effect36: the starting point 
is the definition of  the constitutional principles that are involved in this 
assessment.
The right of  action is the first constitutional value influenced by the 
Article 9(1) of  the Directive 2014/104/EU: the rule of  binding effect pur-
sues the aim to promote the possibility of  actions for antitrust damages. The 
application of  the Article 9(1) involves also two other constitutional princi-
ples: Article 9(1) influences the position of  the defendant and its support-
ing arguments, but it impacts also on the civil judge’s powers of  evaluation. 
For these reasons, it is important to take into account a second constitu-
tional value, the counterpart’s right of  defence, and a third one, the principle 
of  independence of  the judiciary.
The model of  proportionality test has got a first sub-principle, the principle 
of  suitability that implies to verify if  the legal measure adopted is capable 
to satisfy its own objective. It is necessary to determine if  the rule of  National 
Competition Authority’s decision binding effect is suitable to promote the 
right of  action of  a consumer or an undertaking, damaged by an anticom-
petitive conduct, in the context of  civil proceeding.
During the previous analysis, it was underlined the asymmetry of  informa-
tion suffered by the damaged party. There was a problem of  lack of  instru-
ments that the actor could use to collect data and evidences.
Giving a binding value to the National Competition Authority’s decision 
can be a solution in order to reinforce the right of  action. The decision 
of  the Authority is the result of  an investigation and of  an administrative 
proceeding. The institutional means of  the Authority are useful in order 
36 ALEXY, Robert. Constitutional rights and Proportionality. Revus, 2014, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 
pp. 52–57; CARTABIA, Marta. The Principles of  Proportionality and Reasonableness 
in the Italian Constitutional Jurisprudence. In: Corte Costituzionale – Database [online]. The 
Italian Constitutional Court, pp. 4–8 [cit. 19. 7. 2019]; ELLIOT, Mark. Proportionality 
and Deference: the Importance of  a Structured Approach. University of  Cambridge Faculty 
of  Law Research Paper, 2013, Vol. XV, No. 32, p. 1.
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to acquire information. They allow also a deeper assessment of  the fac-
tual elements and of  the economic data. So, the answer to the first part 
of  the test is positive.
Following the model of  proportionality test, the second important sub-prin-
ciple is the principle of  necessity: this principle means that, if  there are two 
means to promote a constitutional value, that satisfy the principle of  suit-
ability, the one that is less invasive for other constitutional principles has 
to be chosen.
The question is if  the rule of  binding effect is a necessary solution, the 
less invasive possible, in order to make stronger the position of  the claim-
ant. The answer is that there is also another hypothesis: it is the rule that 
the legislator adopted in the Article 9(2), another suitable rule for the aim 
of  the Directive 2014/104/EU (the rule of  the value of  prima facie evidence 
of  National Competition Authority’s decisions). Does it fulfil the principle 
of  necessity?
The last part of  the proportionality test is the sub-principle of  proportional-
ity in the narrow sense: it’s relevant to evaluate the relationship between costs 
and benefits in the context of  the constitutional principles that are involved 
in the application of  the rule. It implies a general assessment of  the posi-
tive effects related to a constitutional value and of  the limitation related 
to another one or more.
The rule of  binding effect of  the Article 9(1), on the one hand, promotes 
the claimant’s right of  restoration and, on the other and, limits both the right 
of  defence of  the counterpart, both the independence of  the civil judge.
Considering the counterpart right of  defence, before the civil court, the 
party cannot explain its view about the behaviour, its concrete nature and its 
legal qualification.
These first elements are not sufficient in order to evaluate the dimension 
of  the limitation of  the right of  defence: previously, it is necessary to take 
into account another important aspect. In the context of  each national legal 
order, there can be the possibility to appeal the decision of  the National 
Competition Authority before the administrative judge. This possibility can 
reduce the amount of  the restriction of  the right of  defence.
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Considering the civil tribunal, the rule of  binding effect of  National 
Competition Authority’s decision does not allow the court to evaluate 
the concrete elements and, most of  all, to decide the legal qualification 
of  the infringement.
The civil judge should be able to classify the conduct of  the undertaking with 
an autonomous reasoning. For example, in the case Attrakt s.r.l. v. Google Ireland 
l.t.d.37 there was a question about the legal qualification of  Google’s conduct. 
It was a case of  action for damages in which the claimant, Attrakt s.r.l., pro-
posed the qualification of  the behaviour as abuse of  economic dependence 
or, in alternative, as abuse of  dominant position or, in alternative, as unfair 
competition. The civil judge analysed the particular agreements between 
Google and Attrakt and decided that the conduct of  Google could be con-
sidered as abuse of  economic dependence.
It is possible to affirm that the Article 9(1) realizes most of  all a complete 
limitation of  the power of  assessment of  the judge: if  the binding value 
is recognized to the Competition Authority’s decision, the civil judge cannot 
determine the legal qualification of  the conduct.
On the other side, the last step of  the proportionality test is to apply the 
sub-principle of  proportionality in the narrow sense to the Article 9(2) 
of  the Directive 2014/104/EU. With this rule, the claimant is not penalized 
during the civil litigation, because he can present the decision of  the Authority 
as a central evidence in the context of  his argumentation. At the same time, 
the counterpart can fully exercise his own right of  defence, criticizing the 
content of  the evidence and showing different reconstructions and interpre-
tations. Finally, the civil judge may serve his evaluation without boundaries 
and can take into account both the point of  views of  the involved parties.
In conclusion, Article 9(2) can be useful in order to promote actions for 
antitrust damages and, at the same time, don’t produce excessive limitations 
of  the other constitutional values.
It is possible to think about a reform of  the Article 9(1) of  the Directive 
2014/104/EU. The solution can imply to review the actual rule of  binding 
effect, introducing a different asset of  the burden of  proof: the decision 
37 Decision of  the Tribunal of  Milan, Italy of  17 June 2016, No. 7638/2016. In: JurisWiki 
Italia [online]. [cit. 3. 9. 2019].
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of  the National Competition Authority can be considered as an evidence 
before the civil court of  the same Member State, a kind of  evidence that 
can be crucial in the judge’s evaluation but it is not characterized by abso-
lute value. This could be a definitive solution to the constitutional questions 
object of  analysis in the present research.
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Abstract
Party autonomy entails the right of  individuals to opt out of  the national 
court system and to submit their disputes to arbitration. Party autonomy, 
however, has limits, and not all disputes are equally capable of  being resolved 
by an arbitral tribunal. Issues of  arbitrability may arise with respect to areas 
of  law that involve a strong public interest. Therefore, it is essential to assess 
whether the parties can submit the EU competition law-related disputes 
to arbitration and whether the arbitrators have the power to decide them. 
The problems pertaining to the arbitrability of  competition law disputes 
relate exactly to the public interest character of  such disputes. The objective 
of  antitrust law is the safeguarding of  effective competition in the market. 
Private interests, as such, are important to the extent that their protection 
can be accommodated in the simultaneous protection of  the broader public 
interest. Therefore, the article shall assess the question of  the arbitrability 
of  the EU competition law based on case-law, doctrine and the EU law.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
In 1958 the EU adopted set of  rules which prohibit agreements and arrange-
ments having as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distor-
tion of  competition as well as any abuse of  a dominant position.1 These 
1 BLACKABY, Constantine, Constantine PARTASIDES, Alan REDFERN and Martin 
HUNTER. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 88.
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rules incorporated in Articles 101 and 102 of  the TFEU are to be directly 
applicable in all member states and form the EU antitrust law.
The area of  antitrust law constitutes a matter of  public policy.2 Therefore, 
Articles 101 and 102 of  the TFEU have historically been enforced primarily 
by the Commission which is empowered to investigate, to prohibit behav-
iours, and also to impose heavy fines.3
The question thus arises whether arbitrators are entitled to decide the 
EU competition law-related cases.4
In view of  the party autonomy, parties themselves are entitled to opt out 
of  the national court system and to submit their dispute to arbitration.5
Party autonomy, however, is limited as not all disputes are capable of  being 
resolved in arbitration.6 “The ‘non-arbitrability’ doctrine applies to categories of  sub-
jects or disputes which are deemed by a particular national law to be incapable of  reso-
lution by arbitration, even if  the parties have otherwise validly agreed to arbitrate such 
matters.”7 Naturally, where public policy is involved the issue of  arbitrability 
of  related disputes arises as such disputes may not be capable of  settlement 
by arbitration.8 “It is generally acknowledged that states may set restrictions to the par-
ties’ right to enter into an arbitration agreement with respect to certain types of  disputes 
touching upon sensitive public policy issues that the state wishes to remain in national 
courts’ exclusive jurisdiction.”9 Issues of  arbitrability traditionally arise in those 
areas of  law which involve a strong public interest, such as insolvency law, 
2 Ibid., p. 89.
3 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 960.
4 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 3.
5 GAILLARD, Emmanuel and John SAVAGE. Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 30.
6 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 3.
7 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 943.
8 SENDETSKA, Olga. Arbitrating Antitrust Damages Claims: Access to Arbitration. 
Journal of  International Arbitration, 2018, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 357.
9 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 3.
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employment law, consumer claims, intellectual property rights, criminal law, 
or questions of  personal status.10
Thus, states may: (i) impose limitations on types of  disputes that may 
be subject to arbitration seated within their jurisdiction, and (ii) determine 
that arbitral awards may be refused recognition and enforcement if  they 
concern a subject matter that is not capable of  settlement by arbitration 
under the law of  that jurisdiction.11
Moreover, in the American Safety case the US Court of  Appeal for Second 
Circuit held that: “A claim under the antitrust laws in not merely a private mat-
ter… Antitrust violation can affect hundreds of  thousands, perhaps millions, of  people 
and inflict staggering economic damage. We do not believe Congress intended such claims 
to be resolved elsewhere than the Courts.”12
As the Court of  Justice recognized the EU competition law to be part of  pub-
lic policy, it is necessary to determine its arbitrability. Therefore, the aim of  this 
article is to assess the question of  the arbitrability of  the EU competition law. 
The article shall confirm or refuse the hypothesis that: “Arbitrators are entitled 
to decide on the damages and financial rights arising out of  the EU antitrust law.”
The question of  arbitrability of  the EU competition law will be analysed 
firstly at level of  the EU law and secondly at level of  national arbitration 
law. Moreover, Czech position towards arbitrability of  the EU competition 
law will be assessed.
1.1 Arguments against the Arbitrability 
of the EU Antitrust Law
During the early decades after antitrust legislation was established, courts 
persistently held that antitrust claims were not arbitrable.13
10 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 3; see also SENDETSKA, 
Olga. Arbitrating Antitrust Damages Claims: Access to Arbitration. Journal of  International 
Arbitration, 2018, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 357.
11 SENDETSKA, Olga. Arbitrating Antitrust Damages Claims: Access to Arbitration. 
Journal of  International Arbitration, 2018, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 357.
12 Decision of  US Court of  Appeal for the Second Circuit of  20 March 1968, American Safety 
Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., Inc. In: JUSTIA US Law [online]. [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
13 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 955.
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“The orthodox argument against antitrust arbitrability is that the main objective of  anti-
trust is the maintenance of  a competitive market environment in pursuit of  the pub-
lic interest and hence the collectivity of  consumers (which is a public policy objective 
to be achieved through litigation in the public courts), and not the protection of  the indi-
vidual commercial interest of  private parties, which – in turn – lies at the heart of  inter-
national commercial arbitration.” 14
The emphasis on need for a uniform application of  antitrust rules 
in European space explains the wariness in allowing the enforcement 
of  the EU competition rules to be left in the hands of  private tribunals over 
which little or no control can be exercised.15 Moreover, there is a real danger 
that parties may attempt to avoid the treatment of  competition law issues 
before an arbitral tribunal, especially where they draw a mutual benefit from 
ignoring antitrust legislation.16
Furthermore, US Court of  Appeal for First District in its decision Mitsubishi 
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth explained the non-arbitrability of  compe-
tition law-related disputes as follows: “The reasoning is fourfold: (i) governance 
of  the realm of  antitrust law, so vital to the successful functioning of  a free economy, 
is delegated by statute to both government and private parties, the latter being given special 
incentive to supplement efforts of  the former, the work of  both being equally the grist 
of  judicial decisions, (ii) the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust 
disputes may be contracts of  adhesion militates against automatic forum determination 
by contract; (iii) antitrust issues are – an understatement – ‘prone to be complicated, and 
the evidence extensive and diverse,’ and, we may add, the economic data subject to rigorous 
analysis dictated by a growing and increasingly sophisticated jurisprudence, with the subject 
correspondingly ill-adapted to strengths of  the arbitral process, i.e., expedition, minimal 
requirements of  written rationale, simplicity, resort to basic concepts of  common sense and 
simple equity; and (iv) the notion, suggestive of  the proposition that issues of  war and 
14 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 8.
15 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 21.
16 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 7.
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peace are too important to be vested in the generals, that decisions as to antitrust regula-
tion of  business are too important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business 
community – particularly those from a foreign community that has had no experience with 
or exposure to our law and values.” 17
2 Arbitrability of the EU Antitrust 
Law at European Level
“Although the relationship between the EU law and international arbitration has tradi-
tionally been described as one of  mutual indifference, the two systems interact with each 
other, rather than simply coexisting. Arbitration may facilitate the EU’s goals of  ensur-
ing access to efficiently-delivered justice and dispute resolution, but it can also impede the 
EU’s goals of  harmonizing law across the Member States and of  ensuring the applica-
tion of  specific substantive laws.”18
The EU itself  has historically shown some reluctance to admit that manda-
tory European rules, i.e. the EU antitrust law, could be referred to arbitral 
tribunals.19 The issue of  arbitrability has never been directly dealt with by the 
Court of  Justice, but the Commission has expressed concern that arbitration 
could be used as a means to circumvent the application of  the EU law.20
The Commission has, for example, subjected the availability of  block exemp-
tions to the parties’ obligation to notify any arbitration award made in con-
nection thereto to the Commission.21 This requirement was included in the 
Regulation 2349/84 on patent licensing agreements22 and in the Regulation 
17 Decision of  US Court of  Appeal for the First Circuit of  20 December 1983, Mitsubishi 
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. In: casetext [online]. [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
18 Directorate General for Internal Policies; Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs. Legal Instruments and Practice of  Arbitration in the EU: Study. 
European Parliament [online]. 2014, p. 13 [cit. 29. 04. 2019].
19 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 21.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Article 9 of  the Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89 of  30 November 1988 
on the application of  Article 85(3) of  the Treaty to certain categories of  know-how 
licensing agreements. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
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556/89 on know-how licensing agreements.23 The same requirement was 
incorporated in relation to individual exemptions.24
Furthermore, the Commission has required parties, which had notified 
a contract in accordance with the then applicable Regulation 17/62,25 to sup-
press the arbitration agreement included in said contract.26
Additionally, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on arbitration 
in 1994, in which it expressed its concern that the submission of  disputes 
to arbitration could jeopardize the uniformity of  Community law.27
What is more, the Court of  Justice in 1982 in its decision Nordsee28 ruled 
that arbitral tribunals are not to be considered as a part of  jurisdictional 
system of  Member States and that they cannot refer questions to the Court 
of  Justice. It is not within the scope of  this contribution to analyse the 
details of  the case. It is, however, important to mention that the decision has 
given rise to strong criticism, for it was perceived as an unjustified restriction 
of  the arbitrators’ jurisdictional powers. Moreover, this decision contributed 
to doubts as to arbitrators’ entitlement to decide the EU antitrust cases.29
Next, Brussels I Regulation30 has created a uniform European regime deal-
ing with issue of  recognition of  judgements in civil and commercial matters 
23 Article 7 of  the Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 of  23 July 1984 on the 
application of  Article 85(3) of  the Treaty to certain categories of  patent licensing agree-
ments. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2019].
24 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 21.
25 Regulation No. 17 of  6 February 1962 First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of  the Treaty. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2019] (“Regulation 17/62”).
26 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 21.
27 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Resolution on Encouraging Recourse to Arbitration 
to Settle Legal Disputes. Minutes of  Proceedings of  the Sitting of  Friday, 6 May 1994 
[online]. In EUR-Lex [cit. 17. 3. 2019].
28 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  23 March 1982, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH 
v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei, case C-102/81. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 9. 1. 2019].
29 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 24.
30 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of  judgments in civil and commercial matter. In: EUR-Lex 
[online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2015].
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and it expressly excluded arbitration from its scope. Thus, the enforceability 
of  arbitral awards is regulated by the parallel regime set forth by the New 
York Convention.31 Consequently, the Brussels I bis Regulation32 maintains 
the arbitration exclusion of  its predecessor, but clarifies how it must be inter-
preted. “The Regulation also expressly recognizes the prevalence of  the 1958 New York 
Convention, which should in principle always prevail over the Brussels I system.” 33
The above-mentioned issues did not make the antitrust law-related cases 
non-arbitrable but there was certainly the sign of  a certain distrust towards 
arbitrators: “The EU has, therefore, always shown a certain degree of  intrusiveness with 
respect to the possibility of  parties to resort to arbitration to resolve antitrust claims… 
This was the sure sign that, in the EU’s eyes, arbitrability of  antitrust claims was suspi-
cious or at least that arbitration, if  permitted, ought to be strictly monitored.” 34
The change in the EU’s position towards the arbitrability of  the EU anti-
trust law is related to Eco Swiss case.35 In this decision the Court of  Justice 
ruled that Article 81 of  the TEC (now Article 101 of  the TFEU) constitutes 
a matter of  public policy justifying the annulment or refusal of  enforcement 
of  an award that ignores it.36 The Court of  Justice stated that: “A national court 
to which application is made for annulment of  an arbitration award must grant that applica-
tion if  it considers that the award in question is in fact contrary to Article 85 of  the Treaty 
[now Art. 81 of  TFEU], where its domestic rules of  procedure require it to grant 
an application for annulment founded on failure to observe national rules of  public policy.” 37
31 Directorate General for Internal Policies; Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs. Legal Instruments and Practice of  Arbitration in the EU: Study. 
European Parliament [online]. 2014, p. 14. [cit. 29. 4. 2019].
32 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  judgments 
in civil and commercial matter (recast). In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2015].
33 Directorate General for Internal Policies; Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs. Legal Instruments and Practice of  Arbitration in the EU: Study. 
European Parliament [online]. 2014, p. 14. [cit. 29. 4. 2019].
34 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 21.
35 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  1 June 1999, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton 
International NV, case C-126/97. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2019].
36 BLACKABY, Constantine, Constantine PARTASIDES, Alan REDFERN and Martin 
HUNTER. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 89.
37 Point 41.
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The Court of  Justice did not explicitly prohibit arbitrators’ entitlement to apply 
Article 81 of  the TEC.38 This decision is, thus, understood in a way that it implic-
itly entitles arbitrators to decide issues arising out of  the EU antitrust law.39
Furthermore, the Commission’s signs of  wariness towards arbitration 
of  the EU antitrust cases are considered to be confined to past times.40 The 
EU competition law has become the driving force of  modern market econ-
omies and is in the best interest of  the public that arbitrators apply it rather 
than shy away because of  arbitrability concerns.41
To conclude, the EU law has never directly prohibited the arbitrability 
of  the EU antitrust law.42 As it does not explicitly allow the arbitrability 
of  the EU antitrust law, it is, therefore, suitable to analyse the position 
of  national laws on arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law.43
3 Arbitrability of the EU Antitrust Law 
at Level of National Arbitration Laws
In the last three decades, there has been a general trend towards the expan-
sion of  the category of  arbitrable disputes as international arbitration is pro-
gressively characterized by a widespread movement in favorem arbitrii.44
38 BLACKABY, Constantine, Constantine PARTASIDES, Alan REDFERN and Martin 
HUNTER. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 89; see also BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 
2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2014, p. 978.
39 HERBOCZKOVÁ, Jana. Aplikace evropského soutěžního práva. In: Dny práva – 2009 – 
Days of  Law: the Conference Proceedings [online]. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2009, p. 5 
[cit. 29. 4. 2019]; see also SZOLC, Marek. The EU Competition Law and Arbitration – 
Is it Really a “War of  the Worlds?”. In: Academia [online]. [cit. 01. 05. 2019].
40 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 11.
41 Ibid.
42 HERBOCZKOVÁ, Jana. Aplikace evropského soutěžního práva. In: Dny práva – 2009 – 
Days of  Law: the Conference Proceedings [online]. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2009, p. 3 
[cit. 29. 04. 2019].
43 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 32–33.
44 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 4.
  Arbitrability of the EU Antitrust Law
43
In France, the arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law-related cases was not 
accepted by the French Civil Code45 which stated in its Article 2060 that: 
“One may not enter into arbitration agreements in matters of  status and capacity 
of  the persons, in those relating to divorce and judicial separation or on controversies 
concerning public bodies and institutions and more generally in all matters in which public 
policy is concerned.” The arbitrability of  the EU competition cases, however, 
was acknowledged by the Court of  Appeal in Almira Films v. Pierrel in 1989.46 
Consequently, it was reaffirmed in the Mors/Labinal case in 1995.47
In Italy, the Court of  Appeal of  Milan held that: “Any doubts [as to the arbitra-
bility of  antitrust claims] are now superseded by the evolution of  legal thinking, as well 
as by case law, both at the national and community level: the possibility to arbitrate 
antitrust claims…, that is to say claims that need, in order to be resolved, that a sub-
stantive antitrust rule be applied, is recognised. This is in particular true for disputes 
between private individuals in which the validity of  an agreement is challenged on the basis 
of  Article 81 of  the EC Treaty [101 TFEU].” 48
In Germany, the Competition Act of  1990 restricted the use of  arbitra-
tion.49 The Arbitration Law50 has, however, repealed these provisions and 
the arbitrability of  antitrust rules is now accepted.
In Sweden, Section 1 of  Swedish Arbitration Act of  199951 stipulates that: 
“Arbitrators may rule on the civil law effects of  competition law as between the parties.” 
It is the only example of  an arbitration law containing an express provisions 
on the arbitrability of  competition law.52
45 FRANCE. Civil Code. In: Legifrance [online]. [cit. 05. 09. 2019].
46 Decision of  Cour de cassation, France of  5 February 1991, No. 14-382. In: Legifrance 
[online]. [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
47 Decision of  Cour de cassation, France of  17 October 1995, No. 94-18396. In: Legifrance 
[online]. [cit. 17. 3. 2019].
48 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 20.
49 Ibid.
50 GERMANY. Code of  civil procedure, Book 10. In: Gesetze im Internet [online]. [cit. 5. 9. 2019].
51 SWEDEN. 1999 Arbitration Act. In: Arbitration Institute of  the SCC [online]. [cit. 5. 9. 2019].
52 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. 
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Switzerland is another proponent of  in favorem arbitrii principle. Article 177(1) 
of  Federal Code on Private International Law Act53 states that: “All pecuni-
ary claims may be submitted to arbitration.” Refusal of  arbitral tribunal to apply 
the EU antitrust law is perceived as a ground for setting aside the arbi-
tral award.54 According to Swiss Supreme Court: “The Swiss judge or arbitrator 
who has to decide on the validity of  a contractual agreement concerning markets in the 
European Union examines this issue in the light of  Art. 81 Rome Treaty [Art. 85 
of  the former Rome Treaty]. He must do so notwithstanding the fact that the parties 
agreed on the application of  Swiss law to their contractual relationship.” 55
In England only matters of  strong public interest are considered 
to be non-arbitrable.56
Moreover, the arbitrability of  the EU competition law-related cases 
is accepted in the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg.57
To conclude, arbitral tribunals are nowadays entitled to decide issues related 
to the EU antitrust law in majority of  European jurisdictions.58
According to some views, however, arbitrators should be monitored when 
applying the EU law and, thus, there is a need to reinforce the cooperation 
mechanism between the Commission and arbitral tribunals.59 It has been 
considered that: “Arbitral tribunals should keep the Commission informed of  any pro-
cedure involving the EU antitrust law in order to allow the Commission to ‘monitor’ the 
53 SWITZERLAND. Federal Code on Private International Law of  18 December 1987. 
In: Der Bundesrat. Das Portal der Schweizer Regierung [online]. [cit. 05. 09. 2019].
54 HERBOCZKOVÁ, Jana. Aplikace evropského soutěžního práva. In: Dny práva – 2009 – 
Days of  Law: the Conference Proceedings [online]. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2009, p. 8. 
[cit. 29. 04. 2019].
55 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 979.
56 Article 81(1)(c) of  the ENGLAND AND WALES. 1996 Arbitration Act. Legislation.gov.uk 
[online]. [cit. 05. 09. 2019].
57 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 956.
58 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 8.
59 BORN, Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, pp. 956-957; see also MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law 
from European and US Perspective. In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT 
(eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law 
International, 2011, p. 23.
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proceedings by participating in the hearings ‘either as an observer of  the arbitral proceed-
ings or as an amicus curiae in its own right’, being specified that ‘with regard to ordinary 
EC antitrust arbitrations, the Commission should be allowed to submit amicus curiae 
briefs at any time during the arbitral proceedings’. Moreover, ‘the arbitrator or the arbitral 
tribunal, in case of  doubt or disagreement between the arbitrating parties, should request 
the Commission to suggest the correct interpretation… of  discrete EC law provisions’, 
and such duty would apply ‘irrespective of  the arbitrating parties’ prior consent’.” 60
3.1 Various Situations in which Arbitrators May 
Face the Application of the EU Antitrust Law
It was stated above that nowadays majority of  European jurisdictions accept 
the arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law.
In order to assess the question of  the arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law 
under various national jurisdictions properly, it is further necessary to ana-
lyse different situations in which arbitrators may deal with the application 
of  the EU antitrust law. Generally speaking, these situation may be divided 
into two groups.61
3.1.1 Arbitrability of the EU Antitrust Law Itself
To begin with, arbitrators deal with matters of  arbitrability of  the EU anti-
trust law itself.62
“A claimant may bring an action for abuse of  dominance, provided the parties enter into 
a submission agreement to that effect, i.e. an agreement ex post to submit the dispute that 
has arisen to arbitration. Occasionally, members of  a cartel may also submit their disputes 
to arbitration, which inevitably gives rise to the question as to whether their cartel behaviour 
is at the origin of  their contracting activities and in how far these need to be addressed and 
60 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 23; see also RUBINO-
SAMMARTANO, Mauro. International Arbitration Law and Practice. 2nd ed. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 542.
61 ORGONÍK, Martin. Arbitrabilita sporů vzniklých z porušení soutěžního práva 
z pohledu soutěžního orgánu. In: COFOLA 2010: the Conference Proceedings [online]. Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita, 2010, p. 4 [cit. 05. 09. 2019].
62 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 19.
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assessed in the light of  the applicable antitrust rules in the arbitration.”63 Thus, matters 
of  arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law itself  include issues of  prohibition 
of  an agreement which constitutes a cartel, decisions on abuse of  dominant 
position and questions of  concentration of  undertaking.64
First of  all, it is undisputed that arbitral tribunals generally lack effective 
tools to decide these matters.65 Secondly, depending on the legal regime 
given these matters are usually not subject of  a settlement and as such may 
not be arbitrable.66
Moreover, this category includes the question of  nullity of  agreement which 
is breaching the EUlaw.67 To this date, views on arbitrability of  this matter 
are not united.68
Rubino-Sammartano suggests that: “The nullity of  agreements or practices under the 
EU antitrust law (…), are not issues of  which the parties may dispose.” 69 According 
to Rubino-Sammartano, thus, arbitrators are not entitled to decide on the ques-
tions of  nullity of  agreement which is breaching the EU antitrust law.
Contrastingly, Bridgeman claims that arbitrators’ power to decide on nul-
lity of  the parties’ agreement arises out of  what is known as Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, i.e. the jurisdiction of  an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction.70 This principle is reflected in UNCITRAL Model Law which 
states in its Article 16 that: “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdic-
tion, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of  the arbitration 
agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of  a contract shall 
be treated as an agreement independent of  the other terms of  the contract. A decision 
by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the 
invalidity of  the arbitration clause.” According to Bridgeman: “It would appear that 
63 Ibid.
64 RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, Mauro. International Arbitration Law and Practice. 2nd ed. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 541.
65 SZOLC, Marek. The EU Competition Law and Arbitration – Is it Really a “War 
of  the Worlds?”. In: Academia [online]. [cit. 01. 05. 2019].
66 RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, Mauro. International Arbitration Law and Practice. 2nd ed. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 542.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 BRIDGEMAN, James. The Arbitrability of  Competition Law Disputes. European 
Business Law Review, 2008, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 155.
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this provision permits an arbitrator to determine his/her own competence to determine 
an antitrust dispute and in the case of  an Article 81 challenge find that the substantive 
agreement between the parties is null and void without ipso facto undermining his/her 
own jurisdiction.” 71
This view is further supported by the English Court of  Appeal and the 
House of  Lords which confirmed the separability of  an arbitration agree-
ment from the main agreement in its decision Fiona Trust.72 “This essentially 
confirms the arbitrability of  those competition law infringements that go to the validity 
of  the main contract, thus enabling the arbitrator to hear argument on the validity and 
voidness of  that contract.” 73
In summation, prohibition of  an agreement which constitutes a cartel, deci-
sions on abuse of  dominant position and concentration of  undertaking are 
not issues of  which the parties may dispose. Arbitrators are, thus, usually not 
entitled to rule on these matters. As for the question of  nullity of  agreements 
breaching the EU antitrust law, it remains subject to numerous debates.
3.1.2 Arbitrability of Damages and Financial Rights 
arising out of the EU Antitrust Law
The entitlement of  arbitrators to award damages and financial rights arising 
out of  breach of  the EU antitrust law was confirmed by the Court of  Justice. 
It ruled that effective protection of  the rights granted by the TEC requires 
that individuals who have suffered a loss arising from an infringement 
of  Articles 81 or 82 have the right to claim damages in arbitral tribunals.74
“Parties may usually dispose of  the damages and financial rights arising from them.” 75 
Thus, arbitrators are usually entitled to decide on damages and financial 
rights arising out of  breach of  competition law provisions.76
71 Ibid.
72 Decision of  the Court of  Appeal, England and Wales, of  24 January 2007, Fiona Trust 
and Holding Corporation and others v. Privalov. In: Swarb.co.uk [online] [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
73 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. Bern: 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 9.
74 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  20 September 2001. Courage v. Crehan. Case 
C-453/99. In EUR-Lex [online]. Paras. 26 and 27 [cit. 17. 03. 2019].
75 RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, Mauro. International Arbitration Law and Practice. 2nd ed. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 542.
76 Ibid.
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Therefore, it is today undisputed that arbitral tribunals are recognized 
to be able to deal with the EU competition law-related disputes.77 “The juris-
diction of  an arbitral tribunal is generally the same as that of  national courts: a compe-
tition-related matter will be arbitrable if  it may be litigated in court.”78 Furthermore, 
the arbitrators may apply the EU antitrust rules in order to award damages 
and in certain cases to ascertain that a contract is null and void for breach 
of  competition law.79
3.2 Arbitrability of the EU Antitrust 
Law in the Czech Republic
As for the Czech Republic, the arbitrability is regulated by Article 2 
of  the Czech Arbitration Act.80 Article 2(1) states that: “The parties may con-
clude an agreement that property disputes between them falling within the jurisdiction 
of  courts shall be decided by one or more arbitrators or by a steady court of  arbitration 
(arbitration agreement) except for disputes connected with enforcement of  a decision and 
for disputes provoked by bankruptcy and composition.” Moreover, Article 2(2) stipu-
lates that: “The arbitration agreement may be validly concluded if  the dispute between 
the parties can be solved by concluding a judicial settlement.”
According to the Czech Arbitration Act, thus, three conditions must be ful-
filled in order to invoke an arbitrability of  an issue. Firstly, only property 
disputes (including several exceptions) are arbitrable. Secondly, disputes fall-
ing within the jurisdiction of  courts are arbitrable. Thirdly, disputes are arbi-
trable provided that they may be subject to judicial settlement.81
77 BLANKE, Gordon. EC Competition Law Claims in International Arbitration. In: 
KLAUSEGGER, Christian and Peter KLEIN (eds.). Austrian Arbitration Yearbook. 
Bern: Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2009, p. 8; see also BORN, 
Gary. International Commercial Arbitration. 2nd ed. Aalphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 
2014, p. 957; see also SENDETSKA, Olga. Arbitrating Antitrust Damages Claims: 
Access to Arbitration. Journal of  International Arbitration, 2018, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 357.
78 SENDETSKA, Olga. Arbitrating Antitrust Damages Claims: Access to Arbitration. 
Journal of  International Arbitration, 2018, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 357.
79 MOURRE, Alexis. Arbitrability of  Antitrust Law from European and US Perspective. 
In: BLANKE, Gordon and Philip LANDOLT (eds.). EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: 
A Handbook for Practitioners. Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 20.
80 CZECH REPUBLIC. Act No. 216/1994 Coll. on Arbitration and Enforcement 
of  Arbitral Awards.
81 BĚLOHLÁVEK, J. Alexander. Zákon o rozhodčím řízení a o výkonu rozhodčích nálezů. 2nd 
ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012, p.
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In order to assess the arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law, all the three con-
ditions must be fulfilled cumulatively.82 Firstly, it is undisputed that antitrust 
disputes fall within the category of  property disputes. As for the second 
condition, the EU antitrust disputes fall within the jurisdiction of  courts. 
This also applies to prohibition of  cartel agreements and abuse of  dominant 
position. It is, however, fair to say that only few cases dealing with these 
two issues were brought to national courts as courts’ powers in this field 
are not comparable to those of  Office for the protection of  competition. 
As for the third condition, however, decisions related to prohibition of  car-
tel agreements, abuse of  dominant position and concentration of  undertak-
ing are definitely not subject to judicial settlement.83 Therefore, according 
to the Czech law these matters are not arbitrable. Contrastingly, damages 
or financial consequences resulting from a violation of  the EU competition 
law may be settled by parties and, thus, are arbitrable.
To conclude, generally speaking matters arising out of  the EU antitrust Law 
are arbitrable in the Czech Republic. It is, however, always necessary to assess 
each situation individually as not each issue arising out of  the EU Antitrust 
Law may be subject to judicial settlement.
4 Conclusion
In this article the question of  arbitrability of  the EU antitrust disputes was 
analysed.
In the first part of  this paper, the author was dealing with party autonomy 
and its limits arising out of  public policy. The author emphasized that cer-
tain issues are not arbitrable due to strong public interest associated with 
them. Moreover, it was stated that antitrust law constitutes part of  public 
policy. Consequently, the author described the arguments against the arbi-
trability of  the EU antitrust law.
Furthermore, the author described the development of  the EU’s stance 
towards arbitrability of  the EU antitrust law. Next, the author described 
82 Ibid., p.
83 ORGONÍK, Martin. Arbitrabilita sporů vzniklých z porušení soutěžního práva 
z pohledu soutěžního orgánu. In: COFOLA 2010: the Conference Proceedings [online]. Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita, 2010, p. 7–8 [cit. 05. 09. 2019].
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the attitudes of  various national jurisdictions towards arbitrability 
of  the EU competition law. It was concluded that arbitrability of  these issues 
is generally accepted. It is, however, essential to bear in mind that opinions 
exist, pursuant to which the EU should be allowed to participate and moni-
tor arbitral proceedings where issues of  antitrust are at stake.84 According 
to the author of  this contribution, such a procedure does not correspond 
to fundamental principles, on which the arbitration is based and ignores the 
specificities of  the arbitral jurisdiction.
Next, the author described various situations in which arbitrators may face 
the question of  arbitrability of  the EU law. It was concluded that arbitrators 
are usually not entitled to decide on questions of  prohibition of  an agree-
ment which constitutes a cartel, decision related to an abuse of  dominant 
position and concentration of  undertaking. Moreover, the author proved 
that arbitrators may usually apply the EU antitrust rules in order to award 
damages and in certain cases to ascertain that a contract is null and void for 
breach of  competition law.
Last but not least, the author assessed the position of  Czech law towards the 
arbitrability of  the EU competition law.
The aim of  this paper was to refuse of  confirm the hypothesis that: “Arbitrators 
are entitled to decide on the damages and financial rights arising out of  the EU antitrust 
law.” The hypothesis was confirmed.
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1 Introduction
The EU strives to achieve fully functioning internal market to open com-
petition within its border. Where there is competition, there appear actors 
whose practices may distort the aims pursued by the EU and be detrimental 
to the functioning of  the internal market. The negative impacts of  unfair 
competition affects not only market as such, but more specifically also other 
market actors such as other competitors, consumers and the general pub-
lic. As a protection against such unfair practices, the EU has adopted legal 
acts against such detrimental actions of  market actors. These legal acts are 
of  various nature and regulate the competition from both private law and 
public law perspective.
In this paper, we will focus on the private international law of  the EU which 
deals with the determination of  applicable law to acts of  unfair competition. 
The EU laws pertaining to the applicable law on non-contractual claims 
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arising out of  unfair competition are vested in the Rome II Regulation,1 spe-
cifically in its Article 6(1). The conflict of  laws rules stipulated in Article 6 
do not pose an independent rule different from the general conflicts of  laws 
rule in Article 4(1) of  the Rome II Regulation, but it is rather its clarifica-
tion2 and thus, when interpreting and applying Article 6, one should also 
apply it in conjunction with Article 4(1).3 We note, that our research, and 
this paper as such, will be focusing on the first section of  the Article 6, thus 
excluding the material covered by the remainder of  the provision. In this 
context, we will not be dealing with unfair competition acts affecting a spe-
cific competitor, nor acts restricting free competition.
This paper will be dealing with the interpretation of  the connecting factor 
vested in Article 6(1) in conjunction with Article 4(1). The connecting factor 
used in Article 6(1) is the place, where competitive relations or the collective 
interests of  consumers are, or are likely to be, affected, and the connecting 
factor used in Article 4(1) is the place where the damage occurs irrespective 
of  the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of  the country or countries in which the indirect consequences 
of  that event occur. The conjunction of  the “affection” of  the competitive 
relations or the collective interests of  consumers and the “damage” will 
be the focal point of  the research encompassed in this paper.
Consequently, it is proposed in this paper, that the conclusion on the sub-
ject matter of  this research paper is that when applying and construing 
Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation, we should aim for identifying the 
place where the decision making process of  consumers is impacted. The 
argument that we propose is that current construction of  Article 6(1), which 
is that the place where the advertising occurs is the place where the competi-
tive relations or the collective interests of  consumers is affected, may be too 
narrow and does not reflect upon the consumers’ decision making process 
within the framework of  functioning of  the internal market.
1 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). In: EUR-Lex 
[online]. [cit. 6. 9. 2019] (“Rome II Regulation”).
2 Pursuant to Recital 21 of  the Rome II Regulation: “The special rule in Article 6 is not 
an exception to the general rule in Art. 4(1) but rather a clarification of  it.”
3 This also stems from the Common position (EC) No. 22/2006 adopted by the 
Council on 25 September 2006 with a view to adopting Regulation (EC) No…/… 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of… on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II). In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 6. 9. 2019].
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This paper will be divided into four chapters. After the first introductory 
chapter, we will deal in the second chapter with the meaning and interpreta-
tion of  the “unfair competition” and historical development of  the market-
place principle as both are key concepts for this paper. In the third chap-
ter, we will analyse doctrinal and normative interpretation of  Article 6(1) 
of  the Rome II Regulation and we will inspect on possible interpretations 
and uses of  connecting factor vested in therein. In the fourth chapter, 
we will outline our conclusion that the interpretation of  connecting factor 
contained in Article 6(1) should be based on the place where the decision 
making process of  the consumer is impacted.
2 On Unfair Competition and the Historical 
Development of the Marketplace Effects Rule
Any discussion relating to some subject should begin with discussing the 
meaning of  the terms that are used. In the case of  this paper we deem 
proper to begin with discussing, although briefly, the term “unfair competi-
tion”, looking from the perspective of  the EU law, and, providing some 
historical background on the development of  the marketplace effects rule.
2.1 What Is “Unfair Competition”
Under the EU law the term “unfair competition” is rather problematic. 
Firstly, it has to be interpreted autonomously, and no national notion 
of  the understanding of  “unfair competition” may be relied upon4 except for 
the cases where these notions are consistent with the principles of  the large 
majority of  the Member States.5 Secondly, it does not seem to be consist-
ently used across various EU legislative acts. Honorati has, for example, 
suggested, that “a European and binding definition of  what is intended to be cov-
ered by unfair competition”6 is included in Article 5 of  the Unfair Commercial 
4 DICKINSON, Andrew. The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 428 et seq; HUBER, Peter. 
Rome II Regulation. Pocket Commentary. Munich: DeGruyter, 2011, p. 147.
5 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  14 October 1976, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, case No. 29/76. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 6. 9. 2019].
6 HONORATI, Costanza. The Law Applicable to Unfair Competition’. In: MALATESTA, 
Alberto (ed.). The Unification of  Choice of  Law Rules on Torts and Other Non-Contractual 
Obligations in Europe. Milan: CEDAM, 2006, p. 129.
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Practices Directive.7 Dickinson, on the other hand, points out that the terms 
used in Rome II Regulation, specifically term “unfair competition”, does not 
correspond to the terminology employed in the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, referring specifically to use of  term “unfair commercial practices”. 
This terminological discrepancy causes, from the perspective of  Dickinson, that 
“the [Unfair Commercial Practices] Directive cannot possibly claim to provide an exhaustive 
definition of  the non-contractual obligations falling within Art 6(1) or 6(2)”.8
In the seeking of  the meaning and the scope of  the term “unfair competi-
tion” as used in the Rome II Regulation we are advised by the Commission 
to employ teleological approach. The telos of  the rules against unfair com-
petition is, among others, (i) to protect fair competition by obliging all 
participants to play the game by the same rules, (ii) to outlaw acts calcu-
lated to influence demand (misleading advertising, forced sales, etc.), acts 
that impede competing supplies (disruption of  deliveries by competitors, 
enticing away a competitor’s staff, boycotts), and acts that exploit a com-
petitor’s value (passing off  and the like), and (iii) to seek to protect not 
only competitors (horizontal dimension) but also consumers and the public 
in general (vertical relations).9
2.2 The Development of Marketplace Effects Rule
The marketplace effects rule, or simply marketplace principle, is a determi-
nation of  an applicable law pursuant to place where the interests of  com-
petitors and consumers collide. It is widely agreed that the marketplace prin-
ciple was incorporated into Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation.10 But 
7 Directive (EC) No. 2005/29 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 
May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
market. In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 6. 9. 2019].
8 DICKINSON, Andrew. The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 403.
9 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and the Council on the law appli-
cable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”). In: EUR-Lex [online]. [cit. 6. 9. 2019]. 
(“Commission Proposal”).
10 ALFÉREZ, Francisco G. The Rome II Regulation: On the Way Towards a European 
Private International Law Code. The European Legal Forum, 2007, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. I-85–I-86; 
DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, Pedro A. The Private International Law of  the Intellectual 
Property and of  Unfair Competition Practices: Convergence or Divergence? In: 
LEIBLE, Stefan and Ansgar OHLY (eds.). Intellectual Property and Private International Law. 
Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, p. 156 et seq.
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how did it got there? The development of  the principle began in the second 
half  of  20th century in continental Europe and almost at the same time also 
overseas, in the United States.
At the beginning, there was a general tort claim which encompassed also acts 
of  unfair competition.11 In early 1960’s in Switzerland, Kamen Troller first 
formulated concept of  collision of  interests on the marketplace. He argued, 
that a separate rule for determining applicable law must be used in case 
of  unfair competition. In his understanding, the unfair competition mainly 
protected competitors and not consumers. The core of  the unfair competi-
tion was a violation of  an objective rule of  market conduct, rather than 
an infringement of  a subjective right of  the competitive. Because of  this, 
there does not have to be any damage involved – the focal point is that 
an objective rule was violated. Therefore, he argues, we shall not determine 
the applicable law of  the place where the damage has occurred, instead, the 
marketplace where the violation occurred should serve as an attachment for 
the determination of  the applicable law.
Similar concept was formulated at about the same time by a German law-
yer Erwin Deutsch. His approach was also wrapped around the marketplace 
rule with a distinction from Toller’s approach – Deutsch argued, that if  the 
objective rule of  the market that was violated also protects consumers, that 
the proper place of  attachment should be the place of  the consumer’s resi-
dence. Finally, the third scholar that should be mentioned is Jack Rappeport. 
One of  the main contributions with respect to the unfair competition con-
flict of  laws rule was that he suggested that cross-border unfair competition 
acts form a single cause of  action and that it is not necessary for the claim-
ant to defend her rights in every state where the cross-border unfair compe-
tition act took place.12
So much for the historical development of  the marketplace principle.
11 This perspective prevails in English common law as there, still, is no specific tort 
of  unfair competition.
12 More on the historical perspective see DORNIS, Tim W. Trademark and Unfair Competition 
Conflicts. Historical-Comparative, Doctrinal, and Economic Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017, p. 190 et seq.
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3 Marketplace Effects Rule in the 
Rome II Regulation and Its Construction
It is now time to shift our attention to current state of  law in the 
Rome II Regulation. The Rome II Regulation is a general legal instrument 
which contains conflict of  law rules pertaining to claims arising out of  non-
contractual obligations. The primary aim of  adoption of  this regulation 
and unification of  conflict of  laws pertaining to non-contractual obliga-
tions was the fact, that possibilities of  harmonization of  substantive laws 
of  the Member States in the area of  torts are very unlikely mainly because 
of  the vast diversity of  the relevant substantive laws across the Member 
States.13 Notwithstanding the difficulties on the field of  harmonization 
of  substantive law, the Member States have achieved certain partial develop-
ments on the field of  harmonizing conflict of  law rules concerning torts, 
even with respect to marginal areas.14 It has to be noted, however, that sub-
stantive law pertaining to torts was not left without any harmonization, but 
is only partially harmonized in, for example, Regulations 85/374/EEA, 
72/166/EEA, 84/5/EEA and 90/232/EEA. Further harmonization 
activities concerning substantive law of  torts are represented by the project 
of  Draft Common Frame of  Reference15 and Principles of  European Tort 
Law,16 which are not legally binding (soft law).
One of  the delicts covered by the Rome II Regulation is also acts of  unfair 
competition. This term is not defined in the Rome II Regulation and, 
13 Conceptual differences concerning substantive law of  torts described in more detail 
in, for example: Van GERVEN, Walter et al. Cases, Materials and Texts on National, 
Supranational and International Tort Law. Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law 
of  Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 2 et seq.; Von BAR, 
Christian and Ulrich DROBNIG. The Interaction of  Contract Law and Tort and Property Law 
in Europe. A Comparative Study. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2004, p. 26 
et seq.
14 Van GERVEN, Walter et al. Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and 
International Tort Law. Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of  Europe. Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 10.
15 Von BAR, Christian, Eric CLIVE and Hans SCHULTE NÖLKE (eds.). Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of  European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of  Reference 
(DCFR). Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2009.
16 A compilation of  guidelines by the European Group on Tort Law aiming at the harmo-
nization of  European tort law.
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as a rule of  the European Union law, must be interpreted autonomously 
which is also reiterated in Recital 11 of  the said regulation.
3.1 The Aim of Article 6(1)
In order to understand the aims of  conflict of  laws rule in Article 6(1) we shall 
refer to the preamble of  the Rome II Regulation and specifically to Recital 
16 pursuant to which the goal of  the Rome II Regulation is “to ensure a rea-
sonable balance between the interests of  the parties, i.e. the person claimed to be liable 
and the person who has sustained damage”. In relation to Article 6(1) it stems, 
that the focal point is not direct protection of  the interests of  the Member 
States, but primarily the protection of  the interests of  various market actors, 
such as consumers and companies (enterprises) engaged in the competi-
tion on the internal market. The Preamble sets forth three-fold protection 
extending to competitors, consumers and the general public which is clearly 
expressed in Recital 21 pursuant to which the aim of  the relevant provi-
sions on unfair competition of  the Rome II Regulation is “to protect competi-
tors, consumers and the general public, and to ensure the proper functioning of  the mar-
ket economy”. It has to be stated, that the Recital 21 also stipulates the pur-
pose of  ensuring proper functioning of  the market economy. This poses 
as an incorporation of  protection of  certain economic interests, which 
usually are pursued by the Member States and generally may be perceived 
as a responsibility of  the Member States. Because the Recital 21 deals with 
three actors of  internal market, we may conclude, that the purpose of  unfair 
competition regulation is to balance different economic interests of  com-
petitors, consumers and the general public.
3.2 Connecting Factor in Article 4(1) in Connection 
with Article 6(1) of the Rome II Regulation
Article 4 of  the Rome II Regulation contains multiple sections, but for the 
purposes of  this paper and our argument, we are dealing only with connect-
ing factor vested in the general conflict of  laws rule for non-contractual 
obligations set forth in the first section of  Article 4. As was stated earlier 
in this paper, Recital 21 explains, that the special rule vested in Article 6(1) 
does not pose an exception to general rule in Article 4(1), but clarifies it. 
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In this chapter we will discuss on how Article 6(1) is to be construed in con-
nection with Article 4(1).
Article 4(1) of  the Rome II Regulation is a general rule for determination 
of  applicable law in relation to non-contractual obligations. The connecting 
factor used is the place where “the damage occurs irrespective of  the country in which 
the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of  the country or countries 
in which the indirect consequences of  that event occur”. The focal point of  the provi-
sion is the concept of  “damage”. Hereby we refer once again to Recital 16 
of  the Rome II Regulation, which provides an explanation of  the general 
rule being to “ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of  the person claimed 
to be liable and the person who has sustained damage”.
3.3 The Concept of Damage in Connection 
with Unfair Competition
The concept of  damage in connection with unfair competition is deter-
mined by the wording of  Article 6(1). The damage is understood as the place 
where the competitive relations or the collective interests of  consumers were 
affected, irrespective of  the place where the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred and irrespective of  the place in which the indirect consequence 
of  that event occur. In the light of  above, it must be determined what kind 
of  damage is to be regarded as relevant. In the context of  unfair competi-
tion it may be an effect on the competitor’s position on the market, its status 
or its market share, it may be an effect on the consumers’ process of  making 
transactional decisions, it may be a place where the transaction of  the con-
sumer, being influenced by an act of  unfair competition, is finalized (i.e. the 
place where the contract was entered into) or, finally, a place where the con-
tract was ultimately performed.
The unfair competition regulation in the Rome II Regulation aims to ensure 
proper functioning of  the internal market and the balance of  the interests 
of  various market actors.
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3.4 Brief Outlining of Operation of Consumer 
Decision Making Process in the Market
Because Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation deals with the collision 
of  interests on a market, we shall inquire briefly into how such consumer 
decision making process on market looks like.
Generally, there are four stages of  market transactioning: (i) the first stage 
is competitor’s conduct, which is deemed to determine the place where the 
advertising takes place, i.e. the advertising market; (ii) the second stage is the 
impact of  the competitor’s conduct on the consumer; (iii) the third stage 
is the transactioning itself, meaning the entering into the transaction (an 
agreement) between the competitor and the consumer; (iv) the fourth stage 
is the performance of  that agreement. Usually, these stages take place in a sin-
gle country and there is no problem in identifying the applicable law. But 
there are situations, where the various stages of  market transactioning take 
place in different states. This is illustrated on a following example - a place-
ment of  billboard in the Czech Republic intended for Slovak consumers 
(the first stage takes place in the Czech Republic); the impact of  the com-
petitor’s conduct is on passing-by drivers who see the billboard and are 
affected by it (the second stage also takes place in the Czech Republic); upon 
returning home to the Slovak Republic the affected consumers enter into 
an agreement with the competitor (the third stage takes place in the Slovak 
Republic); and finally, the goods are delivered in the Slovak Republic (the 
third stage takes place also in the Slovak Republic).
On all of  those stages there is some level with interaction between the con-
sumer and the competitor and where there is interaction, there is a poten-
tial collision of  interests. It is now to be determined, which of  the four 
stages should be relevant for determination of  the applicable law pursuant 
to the marketplace principle.
3.5 The Marketplace Principle
The marketplace principle is a theoretical approach of  connecting acts 
of  unfair competition with specific place, which should determine the appli-
cable law pertaining to the act of  unfair competition and any possible claims 
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arising thereto. The difficulties of  determination of  which place is the most 
suitable for establishing sufficient connection between the acts of  unfair 
competition and the applicable law to any non-contractual obligations aris-
ing out of  it does not arise in simple cases such as a situation where, for 
example, advertising for certain product takes place in one state and the 
transaction (i.e. the place where the consumer enters into the contract with 
the competitor) takes place in the same state. In this case, reflecting the con-
necting factor in Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation, the place where the 
competitive relations or collective interests of  consumers are affected, are 
in the same state. However, as was illustrated above, in the globalised world, 
the consumer may be influenced by an advertisement in one state and, under 
the influence of  that advertisement, may enter into a contract in a different 
state. Therefore, the advertising will take place in another jurisdiction than 
the transaction takes place. The place, where the advertising takes place, 
is the place of  conduct of  the competitors, the place where the consumer 
is actually impacted by the advertisement is the place of  impact, and the 
place where the consumers finalises the transaction by entering into a con-
tract is a place of  transaction (meaning the place where the final contract 
is entered into). The place of  performance of  the contract, in our view, does 
not contain sufficient connection between the unfair conduct and the mar-
ket where it occurred, simply because the goods (as a subject of  the con-
tract) may be shipped anywhere.
This presents us with three options on how to construe connecting factor 
in Article 6(1) – either to the place of  conduct, the place of  impact, or to the 
place of  contract, corresponding to the first, the second and the third stage 
described in part 3.4 above.
In the Commission Proposal17 the Commission has sided with the interpre-
tation that the proper construction of  the relevant connecting factor is that 
the attachment should be made to a market, where “competitors are seeking 
to gain the customer’s favour”. In other words, in the place of  advertising or, 
in another words, the place of  conduct, which corresponds to the second 
stage of  the market transactioning.
17 Commission Proposal, point 30.
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However, as it is argued in this paper, the place where the advertising takes 
place, may not be suitable in every situation and may need to be reinter-
preted due to, mainly, the globalized nature of  advertising and its cross-
border effects and the way how the consumers make transactional decisions.
For illustration purposes, we present a following scenario. In a simple case, 
a product is manufactured in Slovakia and is intended for German market 
where it is also advertised. The product is an imitation of  a luxury well 
known product of  another competitor based in Austria. In this case, con-
sumers in Germany. In this case, the place of  conduct (advertising) and 
the place of  contracting will be in Germany and so the German law would 
be applicable. However, in a more complex scenario, the place of  conduct 
attachment may not be so straightforward. For example a situation, where 
a billboard on Czech territory placed by a Slovak company due to better 
prices of  billboard advertising on the Czech side of  the border than on the 
Slovak side of  the border, placed near Czech/Slovak border, is advertising 
for Slovak products. On the basis of  this advertisement, Slovak consumers 
may then buy the product online from Slovakia. In this scenario, the place 
of  conduct is in the Czech Republic and the place of  contracting is in the 
Slovak Republic. Similar scenario may be rare in physical world, but is omni-
present in an online world, where an advertisement may be uploaded in one 
country (place of  conduct) and may be available globally and the consumers 
will be able to purchase the goods from anywhere (the place of  contract). 
We have to bear in mind, that in such scenarios we are called to identify 
a place, where the interests of  various actors collide. We argue, that the place 
where the advertisement is placed, i.e. the place of  conduct corresponding 
to the first stage of  the market transactioning, is not necessarily the place 
where the interests collide.
One of  important decisions in this aspect is the Gran Canaria case.18 This case 
was decided in 1990 but the reasoning of  the German court is still appli-
cable today. The case concerned advertising of  a German based company. 
This company was advertising for merino wool products aimed at German 
tourists in Spain. If  the consumer decided to purchase the goods, the 
18 Decision of  the Bundesgerichtshof, Germany of  3 December 1971, No. BGH 1972 
GRUR 367 – Besichtigungsreisen.
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contract was prepared in German, entered into in Spain, and the wool prod-
ucts were delivered to the German tourists once their returned to Germany. 
The consumer contracts contained a clause pursuant to which the Spanish 
law was governing the contract. The dispute was between the German com-
pany, as defendant, and German consumer association. The association 
asserted, that the contract breached German public law unfair competition 
regulation and is invalid. The German court has adjudicated, that it needs 
to be assessed where the collective interests of  the consumers collided and 
that place is the proper place of  attachment. With respect to advertising 
activities the court has specified, that such place would be in a state where 
the marketing activities were intended to have an effect on the consumers’ 
decision making process, without any regard to a place where the transaction 
might have occurred or where it may have been perfected (performed). This 
doctrine was further developed into a marketplace effect doctrine which was 
ultimately incorporated into Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation.
This is also basis for our position which we intend to defend. On the basis 
of  the above, we believe, that the only proper attachment with respect 
to determination of  applicable law to acts of  unfair competition pursuant 
to Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation is the place where the decision mak-
ing process of  the consumer is impacted. This will correspond to the third 
stage of  market transactioning as described in the part 3.4 above. This place 
of  impact is the place where the competitor aims its marketing endeavours 
and it is also the place where the competitor intends to influence the decision 
making process of  the consumers. We are of  the opinion, that it is the most 
reasonable and satisfactory to the objectives of  the Rome II Regulation 
to determine the applicable law pursuant to a market, where the consumers 
are impacted, as a place where the interests of  competitors and consumers 
collide.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on the construction of  connecting factor 
contained in Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation. Firstly, we have shown 
what were the aims of  the legislator when this provision was introduced. 
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We have referred to, among others, the Commission Proposal which has 
declared that the connecting factor present in Article 6(1) should point 
to a place where the interests of  the market actors collide and this should 
be the place of  conduct of  advertising. Secondly, we have outlined cer-
tain situations in which the abovementioned construction does not pro-
vide satisfactory results which may lead to an attachment of  the relevant 
case to a law of  the state which is not the most suitable for the dispute. 
We have also reviewed the doctrinal and normative approaches to inter-
pretation of  Article 6(1) of  the Rome II Regulation. By summarizing our 
findings we have came to a conclusion that the place of  conduct and the 
place of  contract do not provide for a sound attachment and that the place 
where the decision making process of  the consumer is ultimately affected 
seems to be more appropriate paradigm. This does not require any revisions 
of  Article 6(1) as such, however, a different approach to its interpretation 
is needed.
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